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Abstract 
The use of “levels of abstraction” in philosophical analysis (levelism) has recently come 
under attack. In this paper, I argue that a refined version of epistemological levelism 
should be retained as a fundamental method, called the method of levels of abstraction. 
After a brief introduction, in section two the nature and applicability of the 
epistemological method of levels of abstraction is clarified. In section three, the 
philosophical fruitfulness of the new method is shown by using Kant’s classic 
discussion of the “antinomies of pure reason” as an example. In section four, the method 
is further specified and supported by distinguishing it from three other forms of 
“levelism”: (i) levels of organisation; (ii) levels of explanation and (iii) conceptual 
schemes. In that context, the problems of relativism and antirealism are also briefly 
addressed. The conclusion discusses some of the work that lies ahead, two potential 
limitations of the method and some results that have already been obtained by applying 
the method to some long-standing philosophical problems. 
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1. Introduction 
Reality can be studied at different levels, so forms of “levelism” have often been 
advocated in the past.
1
 In the seventies, levelism nicely dovetailed with the 
computational turn and became a standard approach both in science and in philosophy. 
Dennett [1971], Mesarovic et al. [1970], Simon [1969] (see now Simon [1996]) and 
Wimsatt [1976] were among the earliest advocates. The trend reached its acme at the 
beginning of the eighties, with the work of Marr [1982] and Newell [1982]. Since then, 
levelism has enjoyed great popularity
2
 and even textbook status (Foster [1992]). 
However, after decades of useful service, levelism seems to have come under increasing 
criticism.  
Consider the following varieties of levelism currently available in the philosophical 
literature:  
1) epistemological, e.g., levels of observation or interpretation of a system (see 
section four); 
2) ontological, e.g., levels (or rather layers) of organization, complexity, or causal 
interaction etc. of a system;3 
3) methodological, e.g., levels of interdependence or reducibility among theories 
about a system; and 
4) an amalgamation of (1)-(3), e.g., as in Oppenheim and Putnam [1958].  
The current debate on multirealizability in the philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
and cognitive science has made (3) controversial, as Block [1997] has shown. And two 
recent articles by Heil [2003] and Schaffer [2003] have seriously and convincingly 
questioned the plausibility of (2). Since criticisms of (2) and (3) end up undermining (4), 
rumours are that levelism should probably be decommissioned. 
In this paper, I agree with Heil and Schaffer that ontological levelism is probably 
                                                     
1
 See for example Brown [1916]. Of course the theory of ontological levels and the “chain of being” goes 
as far back as Plotin and forms the basis of at least one version of the ontological argument. 
2
 The list includes Arbib [1989], Bechtel and Richardson [1993], Egyed and Medvidovic [2000], Gell-
Mann [1994], Kelso [1995], Pylyshyn [1984], Salthe [1985]. 
3
  Poli [2001] provides a reconstruction of ontological levelism; more recently, Craver [2004] has 
analysed ontological levelism, especially in biology and cognitive science, see also Craver [forthcoming]. 
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untenable. However, I shall also argue that epistemological levelism should be retained 
as a fundamental and indispensable method of conceptual analysis, if in a suitably 
refined version. Fleshing out and defending epistemological levelism is the main task of 
this paper, where I shall outline a theory of levels of abstraction. This is achieved in two 
stages. First, I shall clarify the nature and applicability of what I shall call the method of 
(levels of) abstraction. Second, I shall distinguish this method from other level-based 
approaches, which may not, and indeed need not, be rescued. Here is a more detailed 
overview of the paper. 
In section two, I provide a definition of the basic concepts fundamental to the 
method. Although the definitions require some rigour, all the main concepts are 
introduced without assuming any previous knowledge. The definitions are illustrated by 
several intuitive examples, which are designed to familiarise the reader with the method. 
In section three, I show how the method of abstraction may be fruitfully applied 
to philosophical topics by using Kant’s discussion of the “antinomies of pure reason”.  
In section four, I further specify and support the method of abstraction by 
distinguishing it from three forms of “levelism”: (i) ontological levels of organisation; 
(ii) methodological levels of explanation and (iii) conceptual schemes. In that context, I 
also briefly address the problems of relativism and antirealism.  
In the conclusion, I indicate some of the work that lies ahead, two potential 
limitations of the method and some interesting results that have already been obtained 
by applying the method to some long-standing philosophical problems in different areas. 
Before starting, one last bit of information and an acknowledgement of my 
intellectual debts are in order. The bit of information concerns a second paper, on the 
same topic, which contains several specific applications of the method of abstraction 
illustrating its fruitfulness. Despite some redundancy between the two papers, the reader 
interested in the topic might be curious to check Floridi [forthcoming-b]. As for the 
debt, many of the ideas presented here were developed in collaboration with Jeff 
Sanders (Floridi and Sanders [2004a]). Although levelism has been common currency in 
philosophy and in science since antiquity, only more recently has the concept of 
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simulation been used in computer science to relate levels of abstraction to satisfy the 
requirement that systems constructed in levels (in order to tame their complexity) 
function correctly (see for example De Roever and Engelhardt [1998], Hoare and He 
[1998]). The definition of Gradient of Abstraction (GoA, see section 2.6) has been 
inspired by this approach. Indeed, I take as a definition the property established by 
simulations, namely the conformity of behaviour between levels of abstraction (more on 
this later). 
 
2. Some Definitions and Preliminary Examples 
In this section, I introduce six key concepts – namely, “typed variable”, “observable”, 
“level of abstraction”, “behaviour”, “moderated level of abstraction” and “gradient of 
abstraction” – some simple examples to illustrate their use, and then the “method of 
abstraction” based on them.  
 
2.1. Typed Variable 
As is well known, a variable is a symbol that acts as a place-holder for an unknown or 
changeable referent. In this article, a “typed variable” is a variable qualified to hold only 
a declared kind of data.  
Definition: A typed variable is a uniquely-named conceptual entity (the variable) 
and a set, called its type, consisting of all the values that the entity may take. 
Two typed variables are regarded as equal if and only if their variables have the 
same name and their types are equal as sets. A variable that cannot be assigned 
well-defined values is said to constitute an ill-typed variable (see the example in 
section 2.3). 
When required, I shall write x:X to mean that x is a variable of type X. Positing a typed 
variable means taking an important decision about how its component variable is to be 
conceived. This point may be better appreciated after the next definition. 
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2.2. Observable 
The notion of an “observable” is common in science, occurring whenever a (theoretical) 
model is constructed. Although the way in which the features of the model correspond 
to the system being modelled is usually left implicit in the process of modelling, it is 
important here to make that correspondence explicit. I shall follow the standard practice 
of using the word “system” to refer to the object of study. This may indeed be what 
would normally be described as a system in science or engineering, but it may also be a 
domain of discourse, of analysis, or of conceptual speculation: a purely semantic 
system, as it were.  
Definition: An observable is an interpreted typed variable, that is, a typed 
variable together with a statement of what feature of the system under 
consideration it represents. Two observables are regarded as equal if and only if 
their typed variables are equal, they model the same feature and, in that context, 
one takes a given value if and only if the other does. 
Being an abstraction, an observable is not necessarily meant to result from quantitative 
measurement or even empirical perception. The “feature of the system under 
consideration” might be a physical magnitude, but we shall see that it might also be an 
artefact of a conceptual model, constructed entirely for the purpose of analysis.  
An observable, being a typed variable, has specifically determined possible values. 
In particular:  
Definition: An observable is called discrete if and only if its type has only 
finitely many possible values; otherwise it is called analogue.4 
In this paper, we are interested in observables as a means of describing behaviour at a 
precisely qualified (though seldom numerical) level of abstraction; in general, several 
observables will be employed.  
 
                                                     
4
 The distinction is really a matter of topology rather than cardinality. However, this definition serves our 
present purposes.  
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2.3. Five Examples 
A good way to gain some acquaintance with the previous concepts is by looking at a few 
simple examples. 
1) Suppose Peter and Ann wish to study some physical human attributes. To do so Peter, 
in Oxford, introduces a variable, h, whose type consists of rational numbers. The typed 
variable h becomes an (analogue) observable once it is decided that the variable h 
represents the height of a person, using the Imperial system (feet and parts thereof). To 
explain the definition of equality of observables, suppose that Ann, in Rome, is also 
interested in observing human physical attributes, and defines the same typed variable 
but declares that it represents height in metres and parts thereof. Their typed variables 
are the same, but they differ as observables: for a given person, the two variables take 
different representing values. This example shows the importance of making clear the 
interpretation by which a typed variable becomes an observable. 
2) Consider next an example of an ill-typed variable. Suppose we are interested in the 
roles played by people in some community; we could not introduce an observable 
standing for those beauticians who depilate just those people who do not depilate 
themselves, for it is well-known that such a variable would not be well typed (Russell 
[1902]). Similarly, each of the standard antinomies reflects an ill-typed variable (Hughes 
and Brecht [1976]). Of course, the modeller is at liberty to choose whatever type befits 
the application and, if that involves a potential antinomy, then the appropriate type 
might turn out to be a non-well-founded set (Barwise and Etchemendy [1987]). 
However, in this paper we shall operate entirely within the boundaries of standard naive 
set theory. 
3) Gassendi provides another nice example, to which I shall return in the conclusion. As 
he wrote in his Fifth Set of Objections to Descartes’ Meditations “If we are asking about 
wine, and looking for the kind of knowledge which is superior to common knowledge, it 
will hardly be enough for you to say ‘wine is a liquid thing, which is compressed from 
grapes, white or red, sweet, intoxicating’ and so on. You will have to attempt to 
investigate and somehow explain its internal substance, showing how it can be seen to 
 8
be manufactured from spirits, tartar, the distillate, and other ingredients mixed together 
in such and such quantities and proportions.”  
What Gassendi seems to have in mind is that observables relating to tasting wine 
include the attributes that commonly appear on “tasting sheets”: nose (representing 
bouquet), legs or tears (viscosity), robe (peripheral colour), colour, clarity, sweetness, 
acidity, fruit, tannicity, length and so on, each with a determined type. If two wine 
tasters choose different types for, say, colour (as is usually the case) then the 
observables are different, despite the fact that their variables have the same name and 
represent the same feature in reality. Indeed, as they have different types they are not 
even equal as typed variables. 
Information about how wine quality is perceived to vary with time – how the 
wine “ages” (Robinson [1989]) – is important for the running of a cellar. An appropriate 
observable is the typed variable a, which is a function associating to each year y:Years a 
perceived quality a(y):Quality, where the types Years and Quality may be assumed to 
have been previously defined. Thus, a is a function from Years to Quality, written 
a: Time → Quality. This example shows that, in general, types are constructed from 
more basic types, and that observables may correspond to operations, taking input and 
yielding output. Indeed, an observable may be of an arbitrarily complex type.  
4) The definition of an observable reflects a particular view or attitude towards the entity 
being studied. Most commonly, it corresponds to a simplification, in which case 
nondeterminism, not exhibited by the entity itself, may arise. The method is successful 
when the entity can be understood by combining the simplifications. Let us consider 
another example.  
In observing a game of chess, one would expect to record the moves of the 
game.5 Other observables might include the time taken per move, the body language of 
the players, and so on. Suppose we are able to view a chessboard by just looking along 
files (the columns stretching from player to player). When we play “files-chess”, we are 
                                                     
5
 As the reader probably knows, this is done by recording the history of the game: move by move the state 
of each piece on the board is recorded – in English algebraic notation – by rank and file, the piece being 
moved and the consequences of the move. 
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unable to see the ranks (the parallel rows between the players) or the individual squares. 
Files cannot sensibly be attributed a colour black or white, but each may be observed to 
be occupied by a set of pieces (namely those that appear along that file), identified in the 
usual way (king, queen and so forth). In “files-chess”, a move may be observed by the 
effect it has on the file of the piece being moved. For example, a knight moves one or 
two files either left or right from its starting file; a bishop is indistinguishable from a 
rook, which moves along a rank; and a rook that moves along a file appears to remain 
stationary. Whether or not a move results in a piece being captured, appears to be 
nondeterministic. “Files-chess” seems to be an almost random game.  
Whilst the “underlying” game is virtually impossible to reconstruct, each state of 
the game and each move (i.e., each operation on the state of the game) can be “tracked” 
within this dimensionally-impoverished family of observables. If one then takes a 
second view, corresponding instead to rank, we obtain “ranks-chess”. Once the two 
views are combined, the original, bi-dimensional game of chess can be recovered, since 
each state is determined by its rank and file projections, for each move. The two disjoint 
observations together, namely “files-chess” + “ranks-chess”, reveal the underlying 
game. 
5) The degree to which a type is appropriate depends on its context and use. For 
example, to describe the state of a traffic light in Rome one might decide to consider an 
observable colour of type {red, amber, green} that corresponds to the colour indicated 
by the light. This option abstracts the length of time for which the particular colour has 
been displayed, the brightness of the light, the height of the traffic light, and so on. This 
is why the choice of type corresponds to a decision about how the phenomenon is to be 
regarded. To specify such a traffic light for the purpose of construction, a more 
appropriate type would comprise a numerical measure of wavelength (see section 2.6). 
Furthermore, if we are in Oxford, the type of colour would be a little more complex, 
since – in addition to red, amber and green – red and amber are displayed 
simultaneously for part of the cycle. So, an appropriate type would be {red, amber, 
green, red-amber}. 
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2.4. Level of Abstraction 
We are now ready to appreciate the basic concept of level of abstraction (LoA).  
Any collection of typed variables can, in principle, be combined into a single 
“vector” observable, whose type is the Cartesian product of the types of the constituent 
variables. In the wine example, the type Quality might be chosen to consist of the 
Cartesian product of the types Nose, Robe, Colour, Acidity, Fruit and Length. The result 
would be a single, more complex, observable. In practice, however, such vectorisation is 
unwieldy, since the expression of a constraint on just some of the observables would 
require a projection notation to single out those observables from the vector. Instead, I 
shall base our approach on a collection of observables, that is, a level of abstraction: 
Definition: A level of abstraction (LoA) is a finite but non-empty set of 
observables. No order is assigned to the observables, which are expected to be 
the building blocks in a theory characterised by their very definition. A LoA is 
called discrete (respectively analogue) if and only if all its observables are 
discrete (respectively analogue); otherwise it is called hybrid. 
Consider the wine example. Different LoAs may be appropriate for different purposes. 
To evaluate a wine, the “tasting LoA”, consisting of observables like those mentioned in 
the previous section, would be relevant. For the purpose of ordering wine, a “purchasing 
LoA” (containing observables like maker, region, vintage, supplier, quantity, price, and 
so on) would be appropriate; but here the “tasting LoA” would be irrelevant. For the 
purpose of storing and serving wine – the “cellaring LoA” (containing observables for 
maker, type of wine, drinking window, serving temperature, decanting time, alcohol 
level, food matchings, quantity remaining in the cellar, and so on) would be relevant. 
The traditional sciences tend to be dominated by analogue LoAs, the humanities 
and information science by discrete LoAs and mathematics by hybrid LoAs. We are 
about to see why the resulting theories are fundamentally different. 
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2.5. Behaviour 
The definition of observables is only the first step in studying a system at a given LoA. 
The second step consists in deciding what relationships hold between the observables. 
This, in turn, requires the introduction of the concept of system “behaviour”. We shall 
see that it is the fundamentally different ways of describing behaviour in analogue and 
discrete systems that account for the differences in the resulting theories. 
Not all values exhibited by combinations of observables in a LoA may be 
realised by the system being modelled. For example, if the four traffic lights at an 
intersection are modelled by four observables, each representing the colour of a light, 
the lights cannot in fact all be green together (assuming they work properly). In other 
words, the combination in which each observable is green cannot be realised in the 
system being modelled, although the types chosen allow it. Similarly, the choice of 
types corresponding to a rank-and-file description of a game of chess allows any piece 
to be placed on any square, but in the actual game two pieces cannot occupy the same 
square simultaneously.  
Some technique is therefore required to describe those combinations of observable 
values that are actually acceptable. The most general method is simply to describe all 
the allowed combinations of values. Such a description is determined by a predicate, 
whose allowed combinations of values is called the “system behaviours”. 
Definition: the behaviour of a system, at a given LoA, is defined to consist of a 
predicate whose free variables are observables at that LoA. The substitutions of 
values for observables that make the predicate true are called the system 
behaviours. A moderated LoA is defined to consist of a LoA together with a 
behaviour at that LoA. 
Consider two previous examples. In reality, human height does not take arbitrary 
rational values, for it is always positive and bounded above by (say) nine feet. The 
variable h, representing height, is therefore constrained to reflect reality by defining its 
behaviour to consist of the predicate 0 < h < 9, in which case any value of h in that 
interval is a “system” behaviour. Likewise, wine too is not realistically described by 
 12
arbitrary combinations of the aforementioned observables. For instance, it cannot be 
both white and highly tannic. 
Since Newton and Leibniz, the behaviours of analogue observables, studied in 
science, have typically been described by differential equations. A small change in one 
observable results in a small, quantified change in the overall system behaviour. 
Accordingly, it is the rates at which those smooth observables vary which is most 
conveniently described.
6
 The desired behaviour of the system then consists of the 
solution of the differential equations. However, this is a special case of a predicate: the 
predicate holds at just those values satisfying the differential equation. If a complex 
system is approximated by simpler systems, then the differential calculus provides a 
supporting method for quantifying the approximation. 
The use of predicates to demarcate system behaviour is essential in any 
(nontrivial) analysis of discrete systems because in the latter no such continuity holds: 
the change of an observable by a single value may result in a radical and arbitrary 
change in system behaviour. Yet, complexity demands some kind of comprehension of 
the system in terms of simple approximations. When this is possible, the approximating 
behaviours are described exactly, by a predicate, at a given LoA, and it is the LoAs that 
vary, becoming more comprehensive and embracing more detailed behaviours, until the 
final LoA accounts for the desired behaviours. Thus, the formalism provided by the 
method of abstraction can be seen as doing for discrete systems what differential 
calculus has traditionally done for analogue systems. 
Likewise, the use of predicates is essential in subjects like information and 
computer science, where discrete observables are paramount and hence predicates are 
required to describe a system behaviour. In particular, state-based methods like Z (Hayes 
and Flinn [1993], Spivey [1992]) provide a notation for structuring complex observables 
and behaviours in terms of simpler ones. Their primary concern is with the syntax for 
                                                     
6
 It is interesting to note that the catastrophes of chaos theory are not smooth; although they do appear so 
when extra observables are added, taking the behaviour into a smooth curve on a higher-dimensional 
manifold. Typically, chaotic models are weaker than traditional models, their observables merely 
reflecting average or long-term behaviour. The nature of the models is clarified by making explicit the 
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expressing those predicates, an issue that will be avoided in this paper by stating 
predicates informally. 
The time has now come to combine approximating, moderated LoAs to form the 
primary concept of the method of abstraction. 
 
2.6. Gradient of Abstraction 
For a given (empirical or conceptual) system or feature, different LoAs correspond to 
different representations or views. A Gradient of Abstractions (GoA) is a formalism 
defined to facilitate discussion of discrete systems over a range of LoAs. Whilst a LoA 
formalises the scope or granularity of a single model, a GoA provides a way of varying 
the LoA in order to make observations at differing levels of abstraction.  
For example, in evaluating wine one might be interested in the GoA consisting of the 
“tasting” and “purchasing” LoAs, whilst in managing a cellar one might be interested in 
the GoA consisting of the “cellaring” LoA together with a sequence of annual results of 
observation using the “tasting” LoA. The reader acquainted with Dennett’s idea of 
“stances” may compare them to a GoA (more on this in section four). 
In general, the observations at each LoA must be explicitly related to those at the 
others; to do so, one uses a family of relations between the LoAs. For this, I need to 
recall some (standard) preliminary notation. 
Notation: A relation R from a set A to a set C is a subset of the Cartesian product 
A × C. R is thought of as relating just those pairs (a, c) that belong to the relation. 
The reverse of R is its mirror image: {(c, a) | (a, c) ∈ R}. A relation R from A to 
C translates any predicate p on A to the predicate PR(p) on C that holds at just 
those c:C, which are the image through R of some a:A satisfying p  
 
PR(p)(c) = ∃a: A  R(a,c) ∧ p(a) 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
LoA. 
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We have finally come to the main definition of the paper:  
 
Definition: A gradient of abstractions, GoA, is defined to consist of a finite set
7
 
{Li | 0 ≤ i < n} of moderated LoAs Li, a family of relations Ri,j ⊆ Li × Lj, for 
0 ≤ i ≠ j < n, relating the observables of each pair Li and Lj of distinct LoAs in 
such a way that:  
1. the relationships are inverse: for i ≠ j, Ri,j is the reverse of Rj,i  
2. the behaviour pj at Lj is at least as strong as the translated behaviour  
 
PRi,j(pi) pj ⇒ PRi,j(pi).     (1) 
and  for each interpreted type x:X and y:Y in Li and Lj respectively, such that 
(x:X, y:Y) is in Rij, a relation Rxy ⊂ X × Y.
8
 
 
Two GoAs are regarded as equal if and only if they have the same moderated LoAs (i.e., 
the same LoAs and moderating behaviours) and their families of relations are equal. A 
GoA is called discrete if and only if all its constituent LoAs are discrete.  
Condition (1) means that the behaviour moderating each lower LoA is consistent 
with that specified by a higher LoA. Without it, the behaviours of the various LoAs 
constituting a GoA would have no connection with each other. A special case, to be 
elaborated below in the definition of “nestedness”, helps to clarify the point.  
If one LoA Li extends another Lj by adding new observables, then the relation Ri,j is 
the inclusion of the observables of Li in those of Lj and (1) reduces to this: the 
constraints imposed on the observables at LoA Li remain true at LoA Lj, where “new” 
observables lie outside the range of Ri,j. 
A GoA whose sequence contains just one element evidently reduces to a single LoA. 
So our definition of “LoA” is subsumed by that of “GoA”. 
                                                     
7
 The case of infinite sets has application to analogue systems but is not considered here. 
8
 I wish to thank Jesse F. Hughes for having pointed out to me the last requirement, without which only 
the variables would be related but not the elements of their types. 
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The consistency conditions imposed by the relations Ri,j are in general quite weak. It 
is possible, though of little help in practice, to define GoAs in which the relations 
connect the LoAs cyclically. Of much more use are the following two important kinds 
of GoA: “disjoint” GoAs (whose views are complementary) and “nested” GoAs (whose 
views provide successively more information). Before defining them, some further 
notations need to be introduced. 
It will be recalled that a function f from a set C to a set A is a relation, i.e., a subset 
of the Cartesian product C × A, which is single-valued, that is:  
 
∀c:C  ∀a, a':A  ((c,a) ∈ f ∧ (c,a') ∈ f) ⇒ a = a' 
 
this means that the notation f (c) = a is a well-defined alternative to (c,a) ∈ f), and total, 
that is:  
 
∀c:C  ∃a:A  f (c) = a 
 
this means that f (c) is defined for each c:C. A function is then called surjective if and 
only if every element in the target set lies in the range of the function, that is:  
 
∀a:A  ∃c:C  f(c) = a. 
 
We are now ready to introduce the definition of GoA: 
Definition: A GoA is called disjoint if and only if the Li are pairwise disjoint 
(i.e., taken two at a time, they have no observable in common) and the relations 
are all empty. It is called nested if and only if the only nonempty relations are 
those between Li and Li+1, for each 0 ≤ i < n−1, and moreover the reverse of each 
Ri, i+1 is a surjective function from the observables of Li+1 to those of Li. 
A disjoint GoA is chosen to describe a system as the combination of several non-
overlapping components. This is useful when different aspects of the system behaviour 
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are better modelled as being determined by the values of distinct observables. Think for 
example of a typical case of Cartesian dualism, in which a disjoint GoA models the 
brain and its observables as a res extensa and the mind and its observables as a res 
cogitans. The case of a disjoint GoA is rather simple, since the LoAs are more typically 
tied together by common observations. For example, the services in a domestic dwelling 
may be represented by LoAs for electricity, plumbing, telephone, security and gas. 
Without going into detail about the constituent observables, it is easy to see that, in an 
accurate representation, the electrical and plumbing LoAs would overlap whilst the 
telephone and plumbing would not. Following the philosophical example, this would 
correspond to a case in which some form of epiphenomenalism is being supported. 
A nested GoA (see Figure1) is chosen to describe a complex system exactly at 
each level of abstraction and incrementally more accurately. The condition that the 
functions be surjective means that any abstract observation has at least one concrete 
counterpart. As a result, the translation functions cannot overlook any behaviour at an 
abstract LoA: behaviours lying outside the range of a function translate to the predicate 
false. The condition that the reversed relations be functions means that each observation 
at a concrete LoA comes from at most one observation at a more abstract LoA (although 
the converse fails in general, allowing one abstract observable to be refined by many 
concrete observables). As a result the translation functions become simpler. 
 
Figure 1 Nested GoA with four Levels of Abstraction  
 
Using the previous example regarding the brain, ideally neuroscientific studies rely on 
nested GoAs, as they proceed from the investigation of whole brain functions and 
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related areas, such as specific kinds of memories, to investigations of the physiological 
basis of memory storage in neurons. On a more prosaic note, let me recall the case of a 
traffic light, which is observed to have colour colour of type {red, amber, green}. This 
is captured by a LoA, L0, having that single observable. If one wishes to be more precise 
about colour, e.g. for the purpose of constructing a new traffic light, one might consider 
a second LoA, L1, having the variable wl whose type is a positive real number 
corresponding to the wavelength of the colour. To determine the behaviour of L1, 
Suppose that constants λred < λred' delimit the wavelength of red, and similarly for amber 
and green. Then the behaviour of L1 is simply this predicate with free variable wl: 
 
(λred ≤ wl ≤ λred') ∨ (λamber ≤ wl ≤ λamber') ∨ (λgreen ≤ wl ≤ λgreen'). 
 
The sequence consisting of the LoA L0 and the moderated LoA L1 forms a nested GoA. 
Intuitively, the smaller, abstract, type {red, amber, green} is a projection of the larger. 
The relevant relation associates to each value c:{red, amber, green} a band of 
wavelengths perceived as that colour. Formally, R(colour,wl) is defined to hold if and 
only if, for each c:{red, amber, green}:  
 
colour = c ↔ λc ≤ wl ≤ λc'. 
 
In the wine example, the first LoA might be defined to consist of the variable “kind” 
having type consisting of red, white, rose under the obvious representation. A second 
LoA might be defined to consist of the observable “kind” having type:  
 
{stillred, sparklingred, stillwhite, sparklingwhite, stillrose, sparklingrose}. 
 
Although the second type does not contain the first, it produces greater resolution under 
the obvious projection relation. Thus, the GoA consisting of those two LoAs is nested.  
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These two important forms of GoA – disjoint and nested – are in fact 
interchangeable, at least theoretically. For if A and B are disjoint sets then A and their 
union A ∪ B are increasing sets and the former is embedded in the latter. Thus, a disjoint 
GoA can be converted to a nested one. Conversely, if A and B are increasing sets with 
the former embedded in the latter, then A and the set difference A \ B are disjoint sets. 
Thus, a nested GoA can be converted to a disjoint one. 
Following the technique used to define a nested GoA, it is possible to define less 
restricted but still hierarchical GoAs. Important examples include tree-like structures, of 
which our nested GoAs are a special, linear case. 
For theoretical purposes, the information captured in a GoA can be expressed 
equivalently as a single LoA of a more complicated type, namely one whose single LoA 
has a type equal to the sequence of the LoAs of the complex interface. However, the 
current definition is better suited to application. 
 
2.7. The Method of Abstraction 
Models are the outcome of an analysis of a system, developed at some LoA(s) for some 
purpose. An important contribution of these ideas is to make precise the commitment to 
a LoA/GoA before further elaborating a theory. This is called the method of abstraction. 
Four advantages of the method can be highlighted here.  
First, and most importantly for our present concerns, it is useful to specify the 
meaning of “indirect knowledge”
9
 in terms of knowledge mediated by a LoA. 
It follows, (second advantage) that specifying the LoA means clarifying, from 
the outset, the range of questions that (a) can be meaningfully asked and (b) are 
answerable in principle. One might think of the input of a LoA as consisting of the 
system under analysis, comprising a set of data; its output is a model of the system, 
comprising information. The quantity of information in a model varies with the LoA: a 
lower LoA, of greater resolution or finer granularity, produces a model that contains 
                                                     
9
 Direct knowledge is to be understood here as typically knowledge of one’s mental states, which is 
apparently not mediated; indirect knowledge is usually taken to be knowledge that is obtained 
inferentially or through some other form of mediated communication with the world. 
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more information than a model produced at a higher, or more abstract, LoA. Thus, a 
given LoA provides a quantified commitment to the kind and amount of information 
that can be “extracted” from the system. The choice of a LoA pre-determines the type 
and quantity of data that can be considered and hence the information that can be 
contained in the model. So, knowing at which LoA the system is being analysed is 
indispensable, for it means knowing the scope and limits of the model being developed. 
Third, being explicit about the LoA adopted provides a healthy antidote to 
ambiguities, equivocations and other fallacies or errors due to level-shifting, such as 
Aristotle’s “metabasis eis allo genos” (shifting from one genus to another), Ryle’s 
“category-mistakes”, and Kant’s “antinomies of pure reason”.  
 Fourth, by stating its LoA, a theory is forced to make explicit and clarify its 
ontological commitment, in the following way. 
We have seen that a model is the output of the analysis of a system, developed at 
some LoA(s), for some purpose. So a theory of a system comprises at least three 
components: 
i) a LoA, which determines the range of available observables and allows the theory to 
investigate the system under analysis and to elaborate 
ii) the ensuing model of that system, which identifies  
iii) a structure of the system at the given LoA.  
Let us refer to this as the system-level-model-structure (or SLMS) scheme (see Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1: the SLMS scheme 
 
The ontological commitment of a theory can be clearly understood by distinguishing 
between a committing and a committed component, within the SLMS scheme.  
A theory commits itself ontologically by opting for a specific LoA, whose 
application commits the theory to a particular model of the system. The order is purely 
logical. By adopting a LoA, the theory decides what kind of observables are going to 
play a role in elaborating the model. In our traffic light example, suppose the LoA 
commits the theory to take into account only data relative to colour type. When the LoA 
generates a model, i.e. when the observables are instantiated, the theory is committed to 
a particular view of the system. Again, in our example, this might be the specific colours 
used in the model.  
To summarise, by accepting a LoA a theory commits itself to the existence of 
certain types of objects, the types constituting the LoA (by trying to model a traffic light 
in terms of three colours one shows one’s commitment to the existence of a traffic light 
of that kind, i.e. one that could be found in Rome, but not in Oxford), while by 
endorsing the ensuing models the theory commits itself to the corresponding tokens (by 
endorsing a particular model, which is the outcome of the interpretation of the data at 
the chosen LoA, one commits oneself to that model, e.g. one now cannot have a fourth 
phase when amber and green are on at the same time). Figure 2 summarises this 
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distinction (note that, for the sake of simplicity the term “theory” is the dotted line that 
comprises, as above, LoA, model and structure). 
 
 
Fig. 2: the SLMS scheme with ontological commitment 
 
3. A Classic Application of the Method of Abstraction 
A simple way to introduce the method of levels of abstraction (LoAs) and highlight its 
philosophical importance is by showing how closely it resembles Kant’s transcendental 
approach. The resemblance is not casual, but a scholarly explanation of this “family 
relation” would take us too far, in an exegetical direction that I am not interested in 
pursuing here. Rather, it is interesting to highlight here the similarities between the two 
methods by referring to Kant’s classic discussion of the “antinomies of pure reason”. 
The only point that the reader may wish to keep in mind, lest I give the impression that 
Kant gets away too lightly with his transcendentalism, is that, in Kant, knowledge of 
reality is indirect because of the mind’s transcendental schematism but, after the 
downfall of Neo-Kantism and Cassirer’s and C. I. Lewis’ revisions of the 
transcendental, an approach is needed that is less infra-subjective, mental (if not 
psychologistic), innatist, individualistic and rigid. In Floridi and Sanders [2004c] and 
Floridi and Sanders [2004b], the method of levels of abstraction has been proposed as a 
more inter-subjective, socially constructible (hence possibly conventional), dynamic and 
flexible way to further Kant’s approach. This is a step away from internal realism 
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(kinds, categories and structures of the world are only a function of our conceptual 
schemes), but not yet a step into external or metaphysical realism (kinds, categories and 
structures of the world belong to the world and are not a function of our conceptual 
schemes, either causally or ontologically). If necessary, it might be called liminal 
realism, for reasons that will become clearer below. With this clarification in the 
background, let us now see the similarities. 
As is well-known, each of the four antinomies comprises a thesis and an 
antithesis, which are supposed to be both reasonable and irreconcilable. I list them here 
by slightly adapting their formulation from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 
[1998]): 
1) Thesis: the world is finite; it has a beginning in time and is limited in space. 
Antithesis: the world is infinite, it has no beginning in time and no limit in space 
(A 426-7/B 454-5). 
2) Thesis: the world is discrete; everything in the world consists of elements that 
are ultimately simple and hence indivisible. 
Antithesis: the world is continuous; nothing in the world is simple, but 
everything is composite and hence infinitely divisible (A 434-5/B 462-3). 
3) Thesis: there is freedom; to explain causal events in the world it is necessary to 
refer both to the laws of nature and to freedom.  
Antithesis: there is no freedom; everything that happens in the world occurs only 
in accordance with natural causation (A 444-5/B 462-3). 
4)  Thesis: there is in the world an absolutely necessary being. 
Antithesis: there is nothing necessary in the world, but everything is contingent 
(A 452-3/B 480-1). 
What I wish to stress here is that Kant’s transcendental method and the method of 
abstraction converge both on the evaluation and on the resolution of these antinomies. 
As Kant argues, the conflict is not between empirical experience and logical 
analysis. Rather, the four antinomies are generated by an unconstrained demand for 
unconditioned answers to fundamental problems concerning (1) time and space, (2) 
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complexity/granularity, (3) causality and freedom or (4) modality. And here is where my 
assessment agrees with Kant’s: the strive for something unconditioned is equivalent to 
the natural yet profoundly mistaken attempt to analyse a system (the world in itself, for 
Kant, but it could also be a more limited system) independently of any (specification of) 
the level of abstraction at which the analysis is being conducted, the questions are being 
posed and the answers are being offered. In other words, trying to overstep the limits set 
by the LoA leads to a conceptual mess. 
As for the resolution, Kant divides the antinomies into two groups. He then 
shows that, in the first two antinomies, both the thesis and the antithesis are untenable 
because the search for the unconditioned mistakes time and space, and 
complexity/granularity, for features of the system instead of realising that they are 
properties set by (or constituting) the level of abstraction at which the system is 
investigated and hence, as such, subject to alternative formatting. Following Kant, one 
may say that, assuming for the sake of simplicity that a LoA is comparable to an 
interface, it makes no sense to wonder whether the system under observation is finite in 
time, space and granularity in itself, independently of the LoA at which it is being 
analysed, since this is a feature of the interface, and different interfaces may be adopted 
depending on needs and requirements. So, from a LoA approach, I agree with Kant: 
neither the thesis nor the antithesis in (1) and (2) are tenable.  
Regarding the third and fourth antinomy, Kant argues that both the thesis and the 
antithesis might be tenable, thus coming close to what has been defined above as a 
disjoint GoA. The mistake here lies in confusing what qualifies the phenomenal world 
of experience – which relies on causal relations and is characterised by contingency – 
with what might qualify the noumenal world of things in themselves – which may 
include freedom and necessary existence, but that remains inaccessible through 
experience. In the language of the method of abstraction, this means that models, i.e., 
the outcomes of the analyses of systems, are always characterised by natural laws of 
causality and a modality of contingencies, but this does not disprove the existence of 
freedom and God “in the systems”, two issues with respect to which one may remain 
 24
agnostic and uncommitted.    
All this clarifies three important aspects of the method of abstraction. First, the 
method is Kantian in nature. Although it does not inherit from Kant any mental or 
subject-based feature, it is a transcendental approach, which considers the conditions of 
possibility of the analysis (experience) of a particular system.  
Second, the method is anti-metaphysical, again in a Kantian sense. Metaphysics 
is – when used as a negative label – what is done by sloppy reasoning when it pretends 
to develop a theory without taking into consideration, at least implicitly, the level of 
abstraction at which it is being developed. In other words, metaphysics is that LoA-free 
zone where anyone can say anything without fear of ever being proved wrong, as long 
as the basic law of non-contradiction is respected. Such an unconstrained game of ideas 
should be found dull and frustrating by anyone genuinely interested in knowledge.  
Third, the method provides a powerful tool to approach significant issues in 
philosophy. We have just seen how it can dispose of false antinomies in a Kantian way. 
I shall mention a few more examples in the conclusion. 
 
4. The Philosophy of the Method of Abstraction 
The time has come to provide further conceptual clarification concerning the nature and 
consequences of the method of abstraction. In this section, I relate the relevant work of 
Marr, Pylyshyn, Dennett and Davidson to the method of abstraction, and discuss the 
thorny issues of relativism and antirealism. A word of warning may be in order. When 
confronted with a new theory or method, it is natural to compare it and perhaps 
(mistakenly) identify it with something old and well-established. In particular, previous 
theories or methods can work as powerful magnets that end by attracting anything that 
comes close to their space of influence, blurring all differences. So this section aims at 
putting some distance between some old acquaintances and the new proposal. 
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4.1. Levels of Organization and of Explanation 
Several important ways have been proposed for speaking of the levels of analysis of a 
system. The following two families can be singled out as most representative: 
1) Levels of organization (LoOs) support an ontological approach, according to which 
the system under analysis is supposed to have a (usually hierarchical) structure in itself, 
or de re, which is allegedly uncovered by its description and objectively formulated in 
some neutral observation language (Newell [1990], Simon [1996]). For example, levels 
of communication, of decision processing (Mesarovic et al. [1970]) and of information 
flow can all be presented as specific instances of analysis in terms of LoOs.  
There is a twofold connection between LoOs and LoAs. If the hierarchical 
structure of the system itself is thought of as a GoA, then for each constituent LoA there 
is a corresponding LoO. Alternatively, one can conceive the analysis of the system, not 
the system itself, as being the object of study. Then the method of abstraction leads one 
to consider a GoA whose constituent LoAs are the LoOs. Note that, since the system 
under analysis may be an artefact, knowledge of its LoO may be available 
constructively, i.e., in terms of knowledge of its specifications. 
2) Levels of explanation (LoEs) support an epistemological approach, quite common in 
cognitive and computer science (Benjamin et al. [1998]). Strictly speaking, the LoEs do 
not really pertain to the system or its model. They provide a way to distinguish between 
different epistemic approaches and goals, such as when one analyses an exam question 
from the students’ or the teacher’s perspectives, or the description of the functions of a 
technological artefact from the designer’s, the user’s, the expert’s or the layperson’s 
point of view. 
A LoE is an important kind of LoA. It is pragmatic and makes no pretence of 
reflecting an ultimate description of the system. It has been defined with a specific 
practical view or use in mind. Manuals, pitched at the inexpert user, indicating “how to” 
with no idea of “why”, provide a good example.  
The two kinds of “structured analysis” just introduced are of course interrelated. 
Different LoEs – e.g., the end-user’s LoE of how an applications package is to be used 
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versus the programmer’s LoE of how it is executed by the machine – are connected with 
different LoAs – e.g., the end-user’s LoA represented by a specific graphic interface 
versus the programmer’s code – which in turn are connected with different LoO – e.g., 
the commonsensical WYSIWYG versus the software architecture. However, LoAs 
provide a foundation for both, and LoOs, LoEs and LoAs should not be confused. Let us 
consider some clarifying examples. 
One of the most interesting and influential cases of multi-layered analysis is 
provided by Marr’s three-levels hypothesis. After Marr [1982], it has become common 
in cognitive and philosophical studies (McClamrock [1991]) to assume that a reasonably 
complex system can be understood only by distinguishing between levels of analysis.  
Here is how Marr himself put it: “Almost never can a complex system of any 
kind be understood as a simple extrapolation from the properties of its elementary 
components. Consider for example, some gas in a bottle. A description of 
thermodynamic effects – temperature, pressure, density, and the relationships among 
these factors – is not formulated by using a large set of equations, one for each of the 
particles involved. Such effects are described at their own level, that of an enormous 
collection of particles; the effort is to show that in principle the microscopic and the 
macroscopic descriptions are consistent with one another. If one hopes to achieve a full 
understanding of a system as complicated as a nervous system, a developing embryo, a 
set of metabolic pathways, a bottle of gas, or even a large computer program, then one 
must be prepared to contemplate different kinds of explanation at different levels of 
description that are linked, at least in principle, into a cohesive whole, even if linking the 
levels in complete detail is impractical. For the specific case of a system that solves an 
information-processing problem, there are in addition the twin strands of process and 
representation, and both these ideas need some discussion.” (Marr [1982], pp. 19–20).  
In particular, in the case of an information-processing system, Marr and his 
followers suggest the adoption of three levels of analysis (all the following quotations 
are from Marr [1982]):  
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1) the computational level. This is a description of “the abstract computational theory of 
the device, in which the performance of the device is characterised as a mapping from 
one kind of information structures, the abstract properties of this mapping are defined 
precisely, and its appropriateness and adequacy for the task at hand are demonstrated” 
(p. 24);  
2) the algorithmic level. This is a description of “the choice of representation for the 
input and output and the algorithm to be used to transform one into the other” (p. 24-
25);  
3) the implementational level. This is a description of “the details of how the algorithm 
and representation are realized physically – the detailed computer architecture, so to 
speak.” (p. 25).  
The three levels are supposed to be loosely connected and in a one-to-many mapping 
relation: for any computational description of a particular information-processing 
problem there may be several algorithms for solving that problem, and any algorithm 
may be implemented in several ways. 
Along similar lines, Pylyshyn [1984] has spoken of the semantic, the syntactic, 
and the physical levels of description of an information-processing system, with the 
(level of) functional architecture of the system playing the role of a bridge between 
Marr’s algorithmic and implementational levels. And Dennett [1987] has proposed a 
hierarchical model of explanation based on three different “stances”: the intentional 
stance, according to which the system is treated, for explanatory purposes, as if it were a 
rational, thinking agent attempting to carry out a particular task successfully; the design 
stance, which concerns the general principles governing the design of any system that 
might carry out those tasks successfully; and the physical stance, which considers how a 
system implementing the appropriate design-level principles might be physically 
constructed. 
The tripartite approaches of Marr, Pylyshyn and Dennett share three important 
features. First, they are each readily formalised in terms of GoAs with three LoAs. 
Second, they do not distinguish between LoO, LoE and LoA; and this because (third 
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feature) they assign a privileged role to explanations. As a result, their ontological 
commitment is embedded and hence concealed. The common reasoning seems to be the 
following: “this is the right level of analysis because that is the right LoO”, where no 
justification is offered for why that LoO is chosen as the right one. Nor is the 
epistemological commitment made explicit or defended; it is merely presupposed. This 
is where the method of abstraction provides a significant advantage. By starting from a 
clear endorsement of each specific LoA, a strong and conscious effort can be made to 
uncover the ontological commitment of a theory (and hence of a set of explanations), 
which now needs explicit acceptance on the part of the user, and requires no hidden 
epistemological commitment, which now can explicitly vary depending on goals and 
requirements. 
 
4.2. Conceptual Schemes 
The resemblance between LoAs and conceptual schemes (CSs) is close enough to 
require further clarification. In this section, I shall briefly compare the two. The aim is 
not to provide an exegetical interpretation or a philosophical analysis of Davidson’s 
famous criticism of the possibility of irreducible CSs, but rather to clarify further the 
nature of LoAs and explain why LoAs can be irreducible, although in a sense different 
from that preferred by supporters of the irreducibility of CSs.
10
  
According to Davidson, all CSs share four features (the following quotations are 
from Davidson [1974]):  
1) CSs are clusters or networks of (possibly acquired) categories. “Conceptual schemes, 
we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give 
form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, 
or periods survey the passing scene” (p. 183).  
2) CSs describe or organise the world or its experience for communities of speakers. 
“Conceptual schemes (languages) either organize something, or they fit it”, and as “for 
                                                     
10
 Newell reached similar conclusions, despite the fact that he treated LoA as LoO, an ontological form of 
levelism that allowed him to escape relativism and antirealism more easily, see Newell [1982] and Newell 
[1993]. 
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the entities that get organized, or which the scheme must fit, I think again we may detect 
two main ideas: either it is reality (the universe, the world, nature), or it is experience 
(the passing show, surface irritations, sensory promptings, sense-data, the given)” (p. 
192).  
3) CSs are inescapable, in the sense that communities of speakers are entrapped within 
their CSs.  
4) CSs are not intertranslatable.  
Davidson argues against the existence of CSs as inescapable (from within) and 
impenetrable (from without) ways of looking at the world by interpreting CSs 
linguistically and then by trying to show that feature (4) is untenable. Could the strategy 
be exported to contrast the existence of equally inescapable and impenetrable LoAs? 
Not quite. 
Let us examine what happens to the four features above when LoAs are in 
question:  
a) LoAs are clusters or networks of observables. Since they deal with observables, LoAs 
are not an anthropocentric prerogative but allow a more general (or indeed less biased) 
approach. We do not have to limit ourselves to human beings or to communities of 
speakers. Different sorts of empirical or abstract agents – not only human beings but 
also computers, animals, plants, scientific theories, measurement instruments etc. – 
operate and deal with the world (or, better, with the data they glean from it) at some 
LoAs. By neatly decoupling LoAs from the agents that implement or use them, we avoid 
confusion between CSs, the languages in which they are formulated or embodied, and 
the agents that use them. I shall return to this point presently.  
b) LoAs model the world or its experience. LoAs are anchored to their data, in the sense 
that they are constrained by them; they do not merely describe or organise them, they 
actually build models out of them. So the relation between models and their references 
(the analysed systems) is neither one of discovery, as in Davidson’s CSs, nor one of 
invention, but one of design, to use an equally general category. It follows that, contrary 
to Davidson’s CSs, it makes no sense to speak of LoAs as Xerox machines or personal 
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organisers of some commonly shared ontology (the world or its experience). Ontological 
commitments are initially negotiated through the choice and shaping of LoAs, which 
therefore cannot presuppose a metaphysical omniscience.  
Because of the differences between (1)–(2) and (a)–(b), the remaining two 
features acquire a significantly different meaning, when speaking of LoAs. Here is how 
the problem is reformulated. LoAs generate, and commit the agent to, information 
spaces. In holding that some LoAs can be irreducible and hence untranslatable I am not 
arguing that:  
i) agents using LoAs can never move seamlessly from one information space to another. 
This is false. They obviously can, at least in some cases: just imagine gradually 
replacing some observables in the LoAs of an agent. This is equivalent to arguing that 
human beings cannot learn different languages. Note, however, that some agents may 
have their LoAs hardwired: imagine, for example, a thermometer;  
ii) agents using LoAs can never expand their information spaces. This is also false. 
Given the nested nature of some LoAs and the possibility of constructing supersets of 
sets of observables, agents can aggregate increasingly large information spaces. This is 
equivalent to arguing that human speakers cannot expand their languages semantically, 
another obvious nonsense. 
So, if we are talking about the agents using or implementing the LoAs, we know 
that agents can sometimes modify, expand or replace their LoAs, and hence some 
degree of intertranslatability, understood as the acquisition or evolution of new LoAs, is 
guaranteed. The point in question is another one, however, and concerns the relation 
between the LoAs themselves.  
LoAs are the place at which (diverse) independent systems meet and act on or 
communicate with each other. If one reads carefully, one will notice that this is the 
definition of an interface. The systems interfaced may adapt or evolve their interfaces or 
adopt other interfaces, as in (i) and (ii), yet different interfaces may still remain mutually 
untranslatable. Consider, for example, the “tasting LoA” and the “purchasing LoA” in 
 31
our wine example. But if two LoAs are untranslatable, it becomes perfectly reasonable 
to assume that:  
iii) agents may inhabit only some types of information spaces in principle.  
Some information spaces may remain inaccessible not just in practice but also in 
principle, or they may be accessible only asymmetrically, to some agents. Not only that, 
but given the variety of agents, what is accessible to one, or some, may not be accessible 
to all. This is easily explained in terms of modal logic and possible worlds understood as 
information spaces. The information space of a child is asymmetrically accessible from 
the information space of an adult, but the information space of a bat overlaps 
insufficiently with the information space of any human agent to guarantee a decent 
degree of translatability (Nagel [1974]). 
In principle, some information spaces may remain forever disjoint from any 
other information spaces that some agents may be able to inhabit. When universalised, 
this is Kant’s view of the noumenal world, which is accessible only to its creator. Does 
this imply that, after all, we are able to say what a radically inaccessible information 
space would be like, thus contradicting ourselves? Of course not. We are only pointing 
in the direction of the ineffable, without grasping it. 
To return to Davidson, even conceding that he may be successful in criticising 
the concept of CSs, his arguments do not affect LoAs. The problem is that Davidson 
limits his consideration to information spaces that he assumes, without much reason, to 
be already linguistically and ontologically delimited. When this is the case, one may 
concede his point. However, LoAs do not vouch for the kind of epistemic realism, 
verificationism, panlinguism and representationist view of knowledge that Davidson 
implicitly assumes in analysing CSs. And once these fundamental assumptions are 
eliminated, Davidson’s argument loses most of its strength. Incommensurable and 
untranslatable LoAs are perfectly possible, although we shall see that this provides no 
good ground for a defence of some form of radical conceptual relativism (section 4.3) or 
anti-realism (section 4.4).  
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Davidson’s criticism ends by shaping an optimistic approach to the problem of 
the incommensurability of scientific theories that supporters of the method of 
abstraction cannot share, but then, what conclusions can be drawn, from our analysis of 
LoAs, about the anti-realist reading of the history of science? An unqualified answer 
would fall victim to the same fallacy of un-layered abstraction I have been denouncing 
in the previous pages. The unexciting truth is that different episodes in the history of 
science are more or less comparable depending on the LoA adopted. Consider the great 
variety of building materials, requirements, conditions, needs and so on, which 
determine the actual features of a building. Does it make sense to compare a ranch 
house, a colonial home, a town house, a detached house, a semidetached house, a 
terraced house, a cottage, a thatched cottage, a country cottage, a flat in a single-storey 
building, and a Tuscan villa? The question cannot be sensibly answered unless one 
specifies the LoA at which the comparison is to be conducted. Likewise, my answer 
concerning the reading of the history of science is: given the nature of LoAs, it is always 
possible to formulate a LoA at which comparing different episodes in the history of 
science makes perfect sense. But do not ask absolute questions, for they just create an 
absolute mess. 
 
4.3. Pluralism without Relativism 
A LoA qualifies the level at which a system is considered. In this paper, I have argued 
that it must be made clear before the properties of the system can be sensibly discussed. 
In general, it seems that many disagreements might be clarified and resolved if the 
various “parties” make explicit their LoA. By structuring the explanandum, LoAs can 
reconcile the explanans. Yet, another crucial clarification is now in order. It must be 
stressed that a clear indication of the LoA at which a system is being analysed allows 
pluralism without falling into relativism or “perspectivism”, a term coined by Hales and 
Welshon [2000] in connection with Nietzsche’s philosophy. As remarked above, it 
would be a mistake to think that “anything goes” as long as one makes the LoA explicit, 
because LoAs can be mutually comparable and assessable, in terms of inter-LoA 
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coherence, of their capacity to take full advantage of the same data and of their degree of 
fulfilment of the explanatory and predictive requirements laid down by the level of 
explanation. Thus, introducing an explicit reference to the LoA makes it clear that the 
model of a system is a function of the available observables, and that it is reasonable to 
rank different LoAs and to compare and assess the corresponding models. 
 
4.4. Realism without Descriptivism 
For a typed variable to be an observable it must be interpreted, a correspondence that 
has inevitably been left informal. This interpretation cannot be omitted: a LoA 
composed of typed variables called simply x, y, z and so on and treated rather formally, 
would leave the reader (or the writer some time later) with no hint of its domain of 
application. Whilst that is the benefit of mathematics, enabling its results to be applied 
whenever its axioms hold, in the method of abstraction it confers only obscurity. Does 
the informality of such an interpretation hint at some hidden circularity or infinite 
regress? Given the distinction between LoO and LoA, and the fact that there is no 
immediate access to any LoO that is LoA-free, how can an observable be defined as 
“realistic”? That is, must the system under consideration already be observed before a 
“realistic” observation can be defined? The mathematics underlying our definitions of 
typed variable and behaviour has been indicated (even if it is not always fully used in 
practice) to make the point that, in principle, the ingredients in a LoA can be formalised. 
There is no circularity: the heuristically appreciated system being modelled never exists 
on the same plane as that being studied methodically.  
The point might be clarified by considering Tarski’s well-known model-theoretic 
definition of truth (Tarski [1944]). Is there circularity or regress there? Might it be 
argued that one needs to know truth before defining it, as Meno would have put it? Of 
course not, and the same resolution is offered here. Tarski’s recursive definition of truth 
over syntactic construction is based on an appreciation of the properties truth is deemed 
to have, but that appreciation and the rigorous definition exist on “different planes”. So 
circularity is avoided.  
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More interesting is the question of infinite regress. Tarski’s definition formalises 
certain specific properties of truth; a regress would obtain only were a complete 
characterisation sought. So it is with the interpretation required to define an observable. 
Some property of an undisclosed system is being posited at a certain level of abstraction. 
An unending sequence of LoAs could possibly obtain were a complete characterisation 
of a system sought.  
It is implicit in the method of abstraction that a GoA is to be chosen that is 
accurate or “realistic”. How, then, is that to be determined without circularity? The 
answer traditionally offered in mathematics and in science is that it is determined by 
external adequacy and internal coherence or, in computer jargon, validation (the GoA 
satisfies its operational goals) and verification (each step in the development of the GoA 
satisfies the requirements imposed by previous steps). First, the behaviours at a 
moderated LoA must adequately reflect the phenomena sought by complying with their 
constraints; if not, then either the definition of the behaviour is wrong or the choice of 
observables is inappropriate. When the definition of observables must incorporate some 
“data”, the latter behave like constraining affordances and so limit the possible models 
(see Floridi [2004a] for further details and examples). Second, the condition embodied 
in the definition of a GoA is a remarkably strong one, and ensures a robust degree of 
internal coherence between the constituent LoAs. The multiple LoAs of a GoA can be 
thought of as interlocking like the answers to a multidimensional crossword puzzle. 
Though such consistency does not guarantee that one’s answer to the crossword is the 
same as the originator’s, it drastically limits the number of solutions, making each more 
likely.  
Adequacy/validation and coherence/verification neither entail nor support naive 
realism. GoAs ultimately construct models of systems. They do not describe, portray, or 
uncover the intrinsic nature of the systems they analyse. We understand systems 
derivatively, only insofar as we understand their models. Adequacy and coherence are 
the most we can hope for.  
 
 35
5. Conclusion 
A long time after Gassendi’s comment to Descartes, Feynman once remarked that “if we 
look at a glass of wine closely enough we see the entire universe. […] If our small 
minds, for some convenience, divide this glass of wine, this universe, into parts – 
physics, biology, geology, astronomy, psychology, and so on – remember that nature 
does not know it!”
11
 In this paper, I have shown how the analysis of the glass of wine 
may be conducted at different levels of epistemological abstraction without assuming 
any corresponding ontological levelism. Nature does not know about LoAs either.  
In the course of the paper I have introduced the epistemological method of 
abstraction and applied it to the study, modelling and analysis of phenomenological and 
conceptual systems. I have demonstrated its principal features and main advantages. Yet 
one may object that, by providing a few simple examples and some tailored case-based 
analyses, the method really predates its applications, which were merely chosen and 
shaped for their suitability. In fact, it is exactly the opposite: Jeff Sanders and I were 
forced to develop the method of abstraction when we encountered the problem of 
defining the nature of agents (natural, human and artificial) in Floridi and Sanders 
[2004b]. Since then, we have been applying it to some long-standing philosophical 
problems in different areas. I have used it in computer ethics, to argue in favour of the 
minimal intrinsic value of informational objects (Floridi [2003]); in epistemology, to 
prove that the Gettier problem is not solvable (Floridi [2004c]); in the philosophy of 
mind, to show how an agent provided with a mind may know that she has one and hence 
answer Dretske’s question “how do you know you are not a zombie?” (Floridi [2005a]); 
in the philosophy of science, to propose and defend an informational approach to 
structural realism that reconciles forms of ontological and epistemological structural 
realism (Floridi [2004b]); and in the philosophy of AI, to provide a new model of 
telepresence (Floridi [2005b]). In each case, the method of abstraction has been shown 
to provide a flexible and fruitful approach. Clearly, the adoption of the method of 
abstraction raises interesting questions, such as why certain LoAs, e.g. the so-called 
                                                     
11
 Feynman [1995], the citation is from the Penguin edition, p. 66. 
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“naive physics” view of the world and the “folk psychology” approach to the mind, 
appear to be “privileged”, or whether artificial life (ALife) can be defined in terms of a 
GoA. So much work lies ahead. 
The method clarifies implicit assumptions, facilitates comparisons, enhances 
rigour and hence promotes the resolution of possible conceptual confusions. It also 
provides a detailed and controlled way of comparing analyses and models. Yet, all this 
should not be confused with some neo-Leibnizian dream of a “calculemus” approach to 
philosophical problems. Elsewhere (Floridi [forthcoming-a]), I have argued that genuine 
philosophical problems are intrinsically open, that is, they are problems capable of 
different and possibly irreconcilable solutions, which allow honest, informed and 
reasonable differences of opinion. The method I have outlined seeks to promote explicit 
solutions, which facilitate a critical approach and hence empower the interlocutor. It 
does not herald any sort of conceptual “mechanics”. 
The method is not a panacea either. I have argued that, for discrete systems, 
whose observables take on only finitely-many values, the method is indispensable. 
Nevertheless, its limitations are those of any typed theory. Use of LoAs is effective in 
precisely those situations where a typed theory would be effective, at least informally. 
Can a complex system always be approximated more accurately at finer and finer levels 
of abstraction, or are there systems which simply cannot be studied in this way? I do not 
know. Perhaps one may argue that the mind or society – to name only two typical 
examples – are not susceptible to such an approach. In this paper I have made no 
attempt to resolve this issue.  
I have also avoided committing myself to determining whether the method of 
abstraction may be exported to ontological or methodological contexts. Rather, I have 
defended a version of epistemological levelism that is perfectly compatible with the 
criticisms directed at other forms of levelism. 
The introduction of LoAs is often an important step prior to mathematical 
modelling of the phenomenon under consideration. However, even when that further 
step is not taken, the introduction of LoAs remains a crucial tool in conceptual analysis. 
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Of course, care must be exercised in type-free systems, where the use of the method 
may be problematic. Such systems are susceptible to the usual paradoxes and hence to 
inconsistencies, not only when formalised mathematically but also when considered 
informally. Examples of such systems arise frequently in philosophy and in artificial 
intelligence. However, I hope to have shown that, if carefully applied, the method 
confers remarkable advantages in terms of careful treatment, consistency and clarity. 
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